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HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY: 
NATO OR THE CFSP? 
Andrew John
Introduction
The end of the Cold War brought about
startling changes in the world. Formerly
oppressed states in Europe received their full
sovereignty at a time when scholars of inter-
national relations were at a loss to explain why
the Cold War ended and what would become of
a Europe without a common enemy to unite it.
Over a decade has passed, and some trends are
now becoming apparent. The Eastern and
Central European countries, newly enriched
with the full rights of self-governing states,
have sought to redefine themselves and seek
out a path which will best provide for their cit-
izens. In this process many of these states,
including Hungary, have ironically chosen of
their own free will to give up some of their
newly regained autonomy to larger interna-
tional institutions such as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European
Union (EU).
Hungary was among the very first of the
post-Warsaw-Pact states to seek membership in
both of these organizations, becoming a full
member of NATO in 1999 and of the EU in
2004. Hungary’s changes in the wake of the end
of the Cold War parallel those of the EU and
NATO, which both face similar crises of purpose
and structure. Both organizations continue 
to expand in membership and redefine their
intentions. This process has caused a conver-
gence of responsibilities for NATO and the EU
in regard to the area of security, which leaves
many countries like Hungary with dual oblig-
ations and a hard choice to make as to which
organization will best provide security to its
members.
In this article I focus on Hungarian for-
eign policy as it relates to the choice between
the EU and NATO. I use a classifying framework
to analyze Hungary’s past foreign policy
actions. Then I compare how the past decisions
of NATO and EU (with regard to the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy [CFSP])
in the security arena correspond to Hungary’s
foreign policy goals and preferences. I then pre-
sent some possible future avenues for
Hungary’s foreign policy with regard to these
organizations.
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Hungary’s Goals Viewed in Context
In order to best elucidate Hungary’s posi-
tion regarding whether the EU, through its
CFSP, or NATO will best suit its security needs,
I must first explain Hungary’s foreign policy
goals. Thankfully, Hungary’s three main foreign
policy objectives are consistently confirmed and
articulated by each government administration.
These three goals are: 1) better ties with the
West and better transatlantic relations, 2) coop-
eration and rapprochement with neighboring
countries, 3) oversight of the situation of
Hungarians in nearby states. The analysis 
of how Hungary has pursued and will continue
to pursue these ends is made easier through 
the use of frameworks created by Andrew F.
Cooper, Associate Director of the Centre for
International Governance Innovation and a
Professor in the Department of Political Science
at the University of Waterloo. In this article I
use Cooper’s frameworks to analyze Hungary’s
past and current foreign policy actions to pre-
dict whether the EU or NATO will afford greater
opportunities for security within the context of
Hungary’s other foreign policy objectives.
In his book Niche Diplomacy: Middle
Powers after the Cold War, Cooper offers two
very general frameworks for categorizing the
diplomatic behaviors of middle powers: one
framework for the older “self-identified” mid-
dle powers of Canada, Australia, Norway, and
Sweden; and another framework for the newer,
recently emerging middle powers most com-
monly identified with the Non-Aligned
Movement, such as Argentina and Malaysia. In
attempting to describe Hungary by using one
of these frameworks, the problem arises of
whether to classify Hungary as an “old” middle
power or a “new” middle power; for Hungary
possesses traits associated with both types.
In addition, the very idea of what charac-
terizes a middle power is debatable, including
Cooper’s own approach. (Chapnick) Cooper
himself has admitted that the changing struc-
ture of world politics in the wake of the end 
of the Cold War has meant that his “two sub-
categories of countries have often rubbed up
against each other.” (Cooper, p. 19) While use-
ful in categorizations of middle powers,
Cooper’s frameworks are far from definitive
judgments and are better used as guidelines for
understanding what types of foreign policy mid-
dle powers have historically preferred. In addi-
tion, states may easily act in ways which con-
tradict past methods or preferences for foreign
policy action. As a result, the methods used in
this article will refer to both frameworks in the
attempt to describe Hungary’s diplomatic
behavior as fully as possible and to thereby best
visualize its future dealings within NATO and
the EU through the CFSP.
“Old” Middle Power Framework
Heroic Hungary and Hungarians
Abroad
The framework used for the “first wave” of
middle powers such as Canada or Australia
employs two axes upon which to gauge diplo-
matic behavior. One axis refers to the form of
diplomacy, whether “heroic” or “routine.”
Heroic diplomacy engenders more “initiative-
oriented” diplomacy associated with formulat-
ing new agendas and even unilateral action, typ-
ified by Cooper as Australia’s efforts to remove
veto rights from the United Nations’ great pow-
ers in the 1940s or as Sweden’s UN ceasefire
proposals during the first Gulf War. (Cooper, 
p. 12) Routine diplomacy entails a “consensus-
oriented style” of tackling certain problems
through the use of institutions to reach an
accord among the international community, as
exemplified by Norway’s role in achieving the
Oslo Accord in the Middle East peace process. 
On this spectrum of the form of diploma-
cy, Hungary lies toward the heroic end. One rea-
son for placing Hungary in this category lies in
the initiatives and actions undertaken on behalf
of the millions of Hungarians living just out-
side the border (covered much more extensive-
ly by Soo Hooi Oh’s article in this same vol-
ume). In the wake of the Treaty of Trianon of
1920, Hungary lost around two-thirds of its ter-
ritory, and as a result three million ethnic
Magyars found themselves under the jurisdic-
tion of several other states, including Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. While Hungary
has been relatively quiet about its loss of terri-
tory in recent years, the more serious issue lies
in the treatment and citizenship rights of
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Hungarians living abroad. Towards this end,
Hungary has repeatedly sought or considered
certain remedies including offering dual citi-
zenship, instituting travel visas, and even crit-
icizing neighboring governments for their
treatment of the Hungarian minority. These
efforts culminated in the passing of the Law on
Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries
in 2001 with 92 percent of the Hungarian
Parliament in favor. (“Act on Hungarians…”)
This law gives certain benefits such as access to
government aid and educational subsidies to
ethnic Hungarians living outside the borders of
the Hungarian state. While the mere passing of
this law, which tends to violate the fundamen-
tal international norm of sovereignty, lends cre-
dence to the claim that Hungary acts to create
new agendas where needs exist, the develop-
ment of the law also adds further information
for analysis.
The passing of this law reflects how
Hungary created and fully supported its own
initiative to fulfill a clearly articulated and
domestically desired foreign policy goal.
However, Hungary did not act unilaterally. In
fact, the EU was consulted as were the neigh-
boring countries within which ethnic
Hungarians reside. The EU ensured that the law
complied with existing European law. Despite
the inclusion of neighboring countries in the
creation of the law, those countries with the
most ethnic Hungarians and, therefore, most
affected by the law (namely Slovakia and
Romania) continued to voice opposition to it.
(“Hungary ‘Status Law’…”) In fact, the ethnic
interest of the Hungarian state caused conflict
with neighboring countries, which in turn
threatened to derail Hungary’s objective of join-
ing both the EU and NATO. Yet Hungary
remained determined, despite its other concern
for good neighborly relations, to serve the needs
of ethnic Hungarians. In this respect, Hungary
further shows its ability to lead an initiative
fully on its own clearly in line with the heroic
form of foreign policy. 
Middle Power on a Middle Path —
Discrete and Diffuse?
The other axis in the “old” middle power
framework refers to the scope of diplomatic
actions taken by the middle power, ranging
from “discrete” to “diffuse.”  Discrete diploma-
cy involves the middle power in only a few issue
areas of specific interest or expertise to it.
Cooper describes Norway as having a discrete
Figure 1
Cooper’s “Old” Middle Power Framework 
(with his exemplary countries added here for reference)
Source:  Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, p. 10. 
Heroic
Routine
DiffuseDiscrete
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scope of diplomacy in that Norway is the “clas-
sic non-joiner,” expressing its preference only
for the two areas of peacekeeping and human-
itarian aid. (Cooper, p. 12) Diffuse diplomacy on
the other hand occurs when the middle power
makes its presence known on a wider array of
issues, often through participation in interna-
tional organizations or regimes. Cooper typi-
fies this scope of action in both Canada’s and
Sweden’s practices in areas from security to
economy to environment to human rights.
(Cooper, p. 11)
Hungary’s past actions do not readily cor-
respond to either extreme of scope. However,
certain trends of behavior make Hungary lean
more towards the discrete end of the spectrum
despite her eagerness to become an active
member in certain international organizations.
As mentioned earlier, Hungary has only three
key objectives in regard to its foreign policy. So
few foreign policy goals might lead one to
believe that Hungary has a very discrete scope
of action. In addition, two of the three goals
(namely, better neighbor relations and support
of Hungarians abroad) involve fostering better
connections with a small number of nearby
states, thereby limiting the need for Hungary
to concentrate on issues far beyond its borders.
However, Hungary’s other goal of foreign poli-
cy, better transatlantic relations, has meant that
she does not ignore the increasingly intercon-
nected world. Towards this end, Hungary has
eagerly joined such organizations as NATO and
the EU, but has yet to assert her presence. For
these reasons, Hungary characterizes an inde-
terminate stance between either extreme scope
of foreign policy.
A relevant example of Hungary’s indeter-
minate stance comes from its role in Iraq.
Originally the Hungarian Parliament voted in
2003 to send 300 soldiers in a non-combat
capacity (transportation and logistics as 
it turned out) and set as a date for the end of
the mission December 31, 2004. In addition,
Hungary allowed the United States to use Taszar
airbase as a civilian training center for Iraqis with
plans to train up to 3,000 Iraqi exiles.
(“Hungarian Iraqi…”) However, due to the
adverse direction the U.S. occupation has taken
and the declining support at home, Hungary has
had to relinquish certain promises to the U.S.
In early November 2004, Hungarian Prime
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány announced that
Hungary would remove its contingent of per-
sonnel from Iraq by March 2005 and actually
pulled out all its troops by the original date 
set by Hungarian Parliament. (“Hungary
Announces…”) In addition, the U.S. postponed
the training of any more Iraqis at the Taszar
base for undisclosed reasons, but one may infer
it had to do with Hungarian domestic opinion
and political pressure. (“Hungarian Iraqi…”)
However, following the removal of its soldiers
from Iraq in December 2004, Hungary donated
77 tanks to the Iraqi government and pledged
150 non-combat troops under the auspices of
NATO to help with training outside of Baghdad.
(Agence France-Presse) Gyurcsány wanted the
Parliament to extend its mission in Iraq, but
lacked support for such a measure. However,
NATO deployments do not require the approval
of the Hungarian Parliament, which allowed the
current dispatch of tanks and non-combat
training personnel. Hungary has shown at once
both an interest in actively pursuing its foreign
policy abroad and also a domestic preference for
staying out of potentially entangling engage-
ments. For this reason, Hungary’s foreign pol-
icy remains indeterminately between diffuse
and discrete.
As an additional example of Hungary’s
indeterminate stance on scope of foreign 
policy, Hungary’s energetic efforts to gain 
membership in both the EU and NATO showed
a willingness to take on a significant role 
in these organizations. However, Hungary 
at times has shown a reluctance to fulfill its
obligations to these organizations. For exam-
ple, Hungary recently missed its government
spending deficit target by a significant amount,
which earned the country a scolding by other
EU member states. (“Hungary Ticked…”)
Hungary has had similar problems with 
meeting NATO budget requirements, and
Hungarian officials suggested that a serious
reassessment of her promises to NATO should
be made. (Barnett) These failures to conform 
to NATO and EU policies could signify a 
reduced future role for Hungary in those 
organizations.
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“New” Middle Power Framework
Accommodative, but to Whom?
The framework created by Cooper for the
wave of emerging middle powers such as
Mexico, Malaysia, and Argentina also uses two
axes to gauge foreign policy actions. The first
axis applies to the area of the intensity of diplo-
matic style, ranging from “combative” to
“accommodative.”  Combative intensity usual-
ly relates to an ingrained policy in many emerg-
ing middle powers of counterweighing or even
opposing whatever stance the United States
takes. Cooper identifies this type of diplomatic
style in Malaysia’s consistent public antagonism
toward the United States in regard to interna-
tional order. (Cooper, p. 18) However, this com-
bative style might also be applied to countering
the stance of other great powers depending on
the issue at hand or the region involved. The
accommodative style indicates alignment with
U.S. policy (or policy of the relevant great
power) in most issue areas, as characterized by
Cooper in Argentina’s “full alignment with the
USA.” (Cooper, p. 18)
Hungarian intensity most definitely falls
into the accommodative style in regard to U.S.
foreign policy as well as EU foreign policy; how-
ever, choosing which power to accommodate at
the expense of the other in the future remains
a pertinent question for many European states
including Hungary. Hungary has been willing
to adjust its policies and practices in order to
gain membership within the EU and U.S.-led
NATO. For example, Hungary concluded bilat-
eral agreements with both Romania and
Slovakia at the behest of the United States so as
to limit the amount of potential conflict that
Hungary could bring into NATO. In addition,
Hungary has had to moderate at times its hero-
ic stance with regard to Hungarians abroad so
as to assuage concerns from other EU members
that she could start a conflict with other poten-
tial EU candidates either before or after 
accession. However, Hungary cannot always fol-
Figure 2
Cooper’s “New” Middle Power Framework 
(with his exemplary countries added here for reference)
Source:  Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War, p. 17. 
Combative
Accommodative
Multilateral Regional/
Bilateral
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low the lead of both the U.S. and the EU.
Fortunately, few if any situations exist where
the U.S. and the EU have come into direct con-
flict on an issue where Hungary has had to
definitively choose between one or the other, as
Hungary would most likely seek not to alienate
either the U.S. or the EU.
Regional/Bilateral When Not
Following the U.S.
The second axis for portraying these
emerging middle powers refers to the “target”
or focus of diplomatic activity, which varies
from “multilateral” to “regional/bilateral.”  The
multilateral focus denotes a middle power
attempting to influence international institu-
tions in order to play an active role in world pol-
itics. Cooper identifies Argentina, which active-
ly courted the United States and other NAFTA
members in an effort to extend NAFTA to South
America, as an example (though not an
extreme) of this multilateral focus as compared
to Brazil, which sought to strengthen the more
exclusive MERCOSUR economic group. The
regional focus refers to a middle power’s ten-
dency to emphasize its relationships with only
a select few (often adjacent) states and to con-
verse with states outside these select few on a
bilateral basis as needed. Cooper illustrates this
focus of diplomatic activity in Malaysian actions
advocating the East Asian Economic Caucus as
a way of strengthening regional economic ties
and potentially limiting outside influence.
While Hungary participates in numerous
international organizations as do most modern
states, the target of its diplomacy has been gen-
erally geared towards the regional/bilateral end
of the spectrum. As mentioned before, two of
Hungary’s three main foreign policy objectives
involve states geographically adjacent to
Hungary. Both goals of better relations with
neighboring states and concern for ethnic
Hungarians in neighboring states ensure that
Hungary’s primary focus will be on its imme-
diate vicinity. While certain neighboring states
belong to the EU, other countries on Hungary’s
borders (Romania and Croatia) currently do
not. Whereas EU political mechanisms might
allow Hungary to address her goals in regard to
other member states, those neighboring coun-
tries still outside the EU will require a region-
al/bilateral approach outside the bounds of a
multilateral forum. Perhaps if and when the EU
expands further to encompass all of Hungary’s
neighbors, Hungary might then be able to
address most of its foreign policy goals within
the EU structure. Until that time, Hungary’s
focus of diplomatic activity will necessarily be
regionally centered.
Hungary’s involvement in the U.S. occu-
pation of Iraq allows further insight into what
target of diplomatic activity Hungary prefers.
As mentioned previously, Hungary contributed
a force of around 300 soldiers to the U.S.-led
coalition involved in post-war Iraq, a force
which was later recalled by the Hungarian
Parliament and then redeployed under the aus-
pices of NATO. These actions by the Hungarian
government reflect the public uncertainty and
even disapproval about the Iraq situation. While
one might conclude that Hungary’s participa-
tion in NATO in this regard denotes a multilat-
eral focus of diplomatic activity, one must con-
cede the fact that the primary driver behind the
invasion of Iraq was not NATO itself, but the
U.S. Hungary values greatly its bilateral 
relationship with the U.S., especially in 
the security realm, as evidenced by Hungary’s
continuing cooperation with the destruction 
of certain types of weapon systems. (“Hungary
Destroys…”; “U.S., Hungary Agree…”)
Hungary’s NATO deployment to Iraq represents
a continuing commitment to its U.S. bilateral
relationship, despite some domestic opposition
to her role in Iraq. Therefore, despite her
actions within the NATO structure, Hungary’s
target of diplomacy lies closer to the region-
al/bilateral end.
NATO and the Common Foreign and
Security Policy: Partners or Rivals?
NATO — Old Faithful
NATO began as a means to balance the
power of the USSR and later the Warsaw Pact
in Europe, and few can argue as to its effec-
tiveness in this regard. However, with the dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact as well as the end
of the Cold War, NATO member states have
increasingly questioned the value of this insti-
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tution. As a result of the lack of a clear enemy,
NATO underwent a redefinition to become a
broader security organization that might face
more numerous, smaller conflicts instead of
one large war. Rather than continuing a strug-
gle against old enemies, NATO instead incor-
porated former Warsaw Pact members, which
is how Hungary, Poland, and the Czech
Republic all came to be NATO members. While
the bureaucracy and command structure of
NATO remain intact, the new members have
widened the scope of NATO’s security concerns.
In fact, NATO has so broadened its mission that
it has involved itself in conflicts far from mem-
ber states.
As a result NATO has found itself looking
beyond its historical realm of interest, and with
a relatively free hand (due to the lack of a size-
able opponent) has acted to combat potential
security threats to its members, as in the cases
of Kosovo and Afghanistan. When NATO con-
ducted air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999,
this military action was the first time NATO
actually went to war, and it indicated a clear
movement away from defense toward a more
proactive role. (Michta, “Is There Life…,” p. 25)
In this situation, Hungary’s own actions as a
new member in support of NATO were, as
Michta states, “adequate, though it was tinged
with seemingly excessive timidity and concern
for safety of its own territory” while at the same
time echoed Hungary’s pursuit of its regional
goal of concern for Hungarians abroad. (Michta,
“Conclusion…,” p. 197) While ultimately
deemed successful in stopping ethnic cleansing
campaigns and setting up a NATO peacekeep-
ing role in the region, this new shift in NATO
objectives has not entirely dissuaded critics who
look toward the coming Afghanistan operation
with great interest. While NATO has proved
itself capable of acting credibly and quickly,
there are some who see it as an archaic insti-
tution which will fade away as Europe rises to
take over its own security obligations.
Common Foreign and Security
Policy — New Kid on the Block
The gradual evolvement of the CFSP 
and of its security/military component, the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP),
occurred under the attentive eyes of the U.S. 
as well as all other NATO members. Many
observers, especially in the U.S., view any
growth of the CFSP as diminishing the role of
NATO. The emergence of the CFSP as the pre-
mier security organization of Europe would
leave the U.S. as well as other NATO allies effec-
tively without a voice in European defense.
However, EU member states and the U.S. gov-
ernment have consistently reaffirmed that
NATO would continue as the defensive base 
for its members, especially in the area of 
crisis management. (“Chapter 15: The Wider
Institutional…”) Also, through the Berlin Plus
Agreement of 2003, NATO and the EU codified
the process by which the CFSP can make use of
NATO assets in operations with the important
understanding that the CFSP would work “in
close coordination and cooperation with
NATO.” (“NATO Topics: NATO-EU…”) 
While a wide variety of issues, ranging
from funding, to EU member states’ dual com-
mitments to both organizations, to new deci-
sion-making processes, certainly have limited
the CFSP’s progress, the CFSP has shown that
its role in regional security is more than just
symbolic. The CFSP has increasingly played a
more dynamic role in the security issues of
Europe, including areas outside member states
of the EU itself. Operation Concordia is one
strong example of the growing role of the CFSP
in regional affairs. Operation Concordia is the
name for the EU takeover of NATO peacekeep-
ing operations (called Operation Allied
Harmony) in the Republic of Macedonia in
2003. While NATO laid most of the groundwork,
the EU agreed to step in for NATO to provide
continued policing of the situation and to even-
tually phase out a military presence entirely. In
addition, the EU played a similar role in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by taking over peacekeeping oper-
ations for NATO’s Stabilization Force and
replacing it with the EU Force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Both of these actions utilize the
Berlin Plus Agreement and make use of NATO
assets. (Monaco)
While this trend towards taking over
peacekeeping operations after NATO lays the
foundation may point to a mutually reinforcing
role for both NATO and the CFSP, Operation
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the
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Congo shows that the CFSP does not need
NATO to act first. The UN Mission in the Congo
(MONUC) could not adequately provide securi-
ty in the province of Bunia in the wake of the
departure of Ugandan forces, so the EU stepped
in to stabilize the situation and provide human-
itarian aid in 2003. (Mace) As the first
autonomous EU operation, many placed sym-
bolic weight upon the success of Operation
Artemis when the EU handed over peacekeep-
ing and other duties back to a buttressed
MONUC force. The success of a mission led by
the EU (and specifically France within the EU)
which was accomplished without resorting to
the use of NATO resources shows that the CFSP
can both play a needed role in international
security and do so without relying on the pre-
dominantly U.S. assets within NATO. (Mace)
The NATO Option — Heroic and
Accommodative
NATO policy more closely coincides with
Hungary’s heroic form of diplomacy simply
because NATO actually has stepped into con-
flicts to stop atrocities from being committed
against minorities, as happened in Yugoslavia.
The CFSP was unable or unwilling to mount
any significant action to combat this crisis.
While obviously not a unilateral action, NATO’s
aerial bombardment and subsequent peace-
keeping efforts showed the ability of the orga-
nization to take the initiative to ensure the
security of its members against potential
threats and, to a lesser extent, its ability to pro-
vide security to ethnic minorities. In addition,
while one may argue that the EU’s Operation
Artemis shows an inclination to proactively step
into a situation, the MONUC force of the UN in
the Congo undoubtedly played a role prior to
EU involvement in laying some groundwork of
which the EU could make use. NATO has shown
itself capable of using significant force on behalf
of minorities in the face of heavy opposition.
This proactive and effective display of influence
clearly corresponds to Hungary’s own heroic
stance.
In terms of the choice between NATO and
the CFSP, Hungary’s accommodative style has
luckily not been put to the test in any signifi-
cant form. Both NATO and the CFSP have been
mostly non-confrontational, with NATO pro-
viding most of the CFSP military assets in any
case. In so far as the Central and Eastern
European countries are trying to avoid having
to choose between the U.S. and the EU, this
preference has proven unattainable in the case
of the Iraq crisis of 2003. The EU accession coun-
tries all supported the U.S.-U.K. group, which
irked some of the opponents of the U.S.-U.K.
position within the EU. (Dunay, “Strategy…,” 
p. 41) However, Pál Dunay, the Director of the
International Training Course in Security
Policy at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy,
is also quick to doubt that these same countries
would “consistently represent the position they
took in the Iraqi case” in the future. For these
reasons, Hungary, while not seeking to isolate
herself from the EU, will not align herself sole-
ly with the CFSP and would therefore most like-
ly side with NATO, at least in the near future.
The CFSP Option — Potentially
Discrete and Relatively Regional
Due to Hungary’s seeming ambiguity in
regard to its scope of foreign policy, one must
be cautious when considering whether NATO
or the CFSP better addresses the issues specif-
ic to Hungary. Neither NATO nor the CFSP tend
to become embroiled in conflicts or other affairs
far away from the borders of its members.
However, growing exceptions to this rule exist
in the form of a role for NATO in Iraq and
Afghanistan and Operation Artemis for the
CFSP. However, the EU’s CFSP has been rela-
tively more reluctant to get involved in securi-
ty issues beyond the borders of its members.
The question now becomes, Will Hungary ever
seek involvement beyond its immediate borders
and, if so, what alliance will best allow Hungary
to promote its agenda?
Hungary recently provided support for the
coalition that invaded Iraq and subsequently
called back its support troops, only later to
return them under NATO auspices. This evi-
dence supports a diffuse foreign policy poten-
tially evolving into a discrete foreign policy due
to domestic public opposition. In taking this
stance, which went against many of the EU
founding members, Hungary has shown, albeit
indirectly, a commitment to the U.S. brand of
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diplomacy. Therefore, since the U.S. most
directly influences NATO, one can argue that
Hungary would be more inclined to support
NATO over the CFSP with regard to the scope
of its foreign policy. In addition, NATO deploy-
ments do not require the approval of
Parliament and thereby give the Hungarian
Prime Minister a freer hand to act in foreign
policy matters as long as it is within the NATO
framework. However, due to Hungary’s limited
and politically unsupported time in Iraq, a
swing to a more discrete foreign policy scope
may be likely in the future. There remains
much uncertainty as to the short- and long-
term effects of Hungary’s experience in Iraq,
and a small shift to either a more discrete or
more diffuse scope of foreign policy could eas-
ily change Hungary’s preference for NATO or
the CFSP.
On the other hand, Hungarian foreign pol-
icy leans definitively towards the regional/bilat-
eral end of the focus axis, though one might
debate whether the EU or NATO is strictly
“regional,” since both increasingly interact with
a significant portion of the planet. While
Hungary can address its goal of transatlantic
relations through the use of NATO in the secu-
rity realm and through the EU in the political
and economic realms, Hungary has not
attempted to play a proactive role in either
forum as of yet. Supporting Hungarians in
neighboring states and better relations with
these states ensure that the main focus of
Hungarian foreign policy will be regional, but
so far Hungary has acted bilaterally to address
these problems. Unless Hungary becomes more
active in either NATO or the EU, the question
of whether or not these institutions correspond
to Hungary’s regional preference remains unre-
solved. 
However, the EU’s CFSP does tend to bet-
ter serve Hungary’s foreign policy preferences
than does NATO. NATO is relatively more wide-
ly-based and widely-involved than the CFSP.
The trend for NATO to get involved early on in
crises and for the CFSP to take over the peace-
keeping efforts has occurred mostly in regions
close to EU members. (Greco, pp. 70–71)
However, the CFSP, while focused more direct-
ly on the region valued by Hungary, has yet to
prove itself ready and willing to act in a serious
situation without NATO to lead the way.
Therefore, Hungary will necessarily remain
close to NATO as it remains the sole credible
security force in the region. The future will-
ingness of the EU to take the lead in security
issues close to Europe and to become a real
presence in the region will have a significant
impact on whether Hungary ultimately choos-
es to associate with the CFSP at the expense of
NATO.
Conclusion
In the present state of affairs, the frame-
work analysis implies that Hungary faces a very
difficult choice. While most of Hungary’s for-
eign policy goals can be addressed through 
the EU, NATO appears to be the best source of
security for Hungary as well as a prime means
for continuing interaction with the U.S.
Fortunately, Hungary does not face an immi-
nent deadline with respect to which security
organization it must choose. There currently
exists room for membership in both NATO and
the CFSP, and as mentioned before these two
organizations are learning to cooperate and
exist in conjunction as well as independently.
But where does this relationship leave Hungary,
and how might future changes in both NATO
and the CFSP affect Hungary’s choice?
One potential course of action for
Hungary has been that of mediator or at least
impartial third party, playing a niche role in
both organizations. As long as memberships in
NATO and the CFSP are not mutually exclusive,
Hungary can selectively choose when to
become involved and thereby maintain some
room to maneuver. In addition, as long as NATO
remains the sole viable option for crisis inter-
vention and the CFSP continues its role in
peacekeeping and lower-level engagements,
Hungary has no need to choose between them.
However, this choice of action depends upon
the assumption that the present relationship
between NATO and the CFSP remains the 
same and that Hungary will continue to par-
ticipate in security operations, both of which
are uncertain.
In the face of such uncertainty, some have
even suggested that Hungary take a wait-and-
see approach. Elements of such an approach
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